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INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES-THEIR ROLE
IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
R. J. FARLEY t
IN the standard works on instructions to juries one is confronted
by a mass of descriptive classes of instructions. There is usually
a division into definitions and distinctions, province of the court
and jury, abstract and concrete statement, confinement to pleadings
and evidence, presumptions and inferences, resolution of issues,
commenting on the weight of evidence and cautionary instructions.
The case-books either omit the matter entirely or often give so
highly strained and inadequate a treatment as to be misleading.
At first glance such a method as above outlined seems quite un-
satisfactory but as one progresses in analysis the more difficult it
becomes to devise an improvement.
Significant is a paragraph in the publisher's preface to one of
the late works on the subject:
"The supervising editor, for more than a generation has constantly watched
the stream of current decisions which has flowed into the reservoir of
reported cases; he has observed the questions debated and decided in these
cases; and one thing that has been borne in upon him is the fact that
almost one-half of the legal warfare inscribed on the pages in these
opinions deals with the subject of the Province of the Court and Jury,
and the delimitation of that province in the instructions of the trial
judge in the court below. In this stream of opinions he has seen the
same case come several times before the same appellate court, indicating
tragic consequences in the administration of justice, due wholly to the
failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury according to the established
law." 1
No one who has observed the prevalence of cases involving in-
structions will question these observations, though he may wonder
just what is an instruction "according to the established law." It
is submitted that it is practically impossible to write an instruction
tProfessor of Law, University of Mississippi. This paper was written in
connection with a seminar on Law Administration while the writer was a
Sterling Research Fellow in the Yale School of Law. Acknowledgement is
made to Professor Thurman W. Arnold of the Yale School of Law for many
helpful suggestions.
1. RANDALL, INSTRUCTIONS TO JuRrs (1922) iii.
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of any consequence as such that could not be subjected to valid
criticism as erroneous under the "established law." Similarly it
is impossible to correlate the various artificialities of definition and
description into a satisfactory body of doctrine. Therefore the
object of a paper on instructions may well be to consider their limita-
tions and the art and artifices in the use of them which tend to
make such a correlation impossible.
An adequate presentation of the subject requires an examination
of the growth of these functions. This will necessitate a sketch of
the development of the jury from the standpoint of the use of the
attaint and fine as early methods of control and their eventual
displacement by the more effective procedure of granting new frials.-
Following this historical predicate, the subject will then be divided
into:
I. The Theoretical Function of Instructions to Enlighten the
Jury on the Law.
II. The Function of Instructions as a Mlethod by which Appellate
Courts Control Juries and Trial Courts.
Ill. The Function of Instructions from the Lawyer's View-Point
as Traps for the Courts.
IV. The Function of Instructions as a Mlethod by Which the Trial
Court Maintains Its Integrity.
V. Procedural Problems Arising as a Result and the Escapes from
These Problems.
Historical Introduction
THE origin of trial by jury is unknown to the authorities. It is
certain, however, that by the time of Henry I in criminal cases
it had all the essential features known to us except that the same
body sometimes discharged the functions of both a grand and petit
jury.4 And by the time of Henry VI the requirement of personal
2. The authorities drawn on most extensively are FORSYTH, HISTORY OF
TRIAL BY JURY (1852); Thayer's series of articles in (1891-92) 5 HAv. L.
REv. (the material here utilized is also found in his PELiAIiNAnY TnEATisD
on EVIDENCE (1899) ); BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND (1880);
and Appendix II of Quincy's Reports (Massachusetts 1761).
3. The Statute of 13 EDW. I, C. 30 (1285) had enacted that the justices of
assise should also hold inquests of trespass and other pleas wherein small
examination was required and even of more important matters requiring great
examination, if both parties desired it.
4. FORSYTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 200. Even this separation bad oc-
curred by the time of Edward HI. Id. at 206.
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knowledge on the part of the jurors was the only substantial dis-
similarity to the modern jury in civil cases.5
That juries were originally bodies of witnesses, probably furnished
the dominant factor in attitude for several hundred years. The
more or less arbitrary control of them by the judge in earlier, days 0
was as much a matter of course as is today the directing of witnesses
to retire to the proper room after being sworn. There could have
been no sharp cleavage between law and fact in a country where
the testimony consisted of legal conclusions and God was the ruling
principle.7 As yet no importance was attached to the separation of
principle from evidence or to the invasion of respective pro-
vinces." If the jury took upon themselves the peril of a general
verdict,9 the recourse for dissatisfaction in civil cases was to be
found in the attaint, wherein a contrary holding by a second jury
of twenty-four was proof of the untruth of the first verdict and
of the perjury of the twelve who had rendered it.
5. -FORSYTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 159, quoting FORTESCUn, Dn LAUDIBUS
LEGUm ANGLIAE.
6. If doubt was entertained by the judge on the verdict, he interrogated
the jurors, and if he suspected them of concealing the truth examined them
separately. FORSYTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 206, 207. In civil cases he
might re-summon them for further questioning. Brac. N. B. II, Case 887
(1232) ; Id. III, case 1226 (1237).
7. "You shall tell us by the oath which you have made whether B be fully
tenant of 14 acres or not. . . . The assise came and said that B was tenant
of 14 acres and that such an one was tenant of the remaining acre of the
fifteen acres." Y. B. Trin. 20 Edw. I, f. 2 (1291). "N, who is here present
accused of such and such a felony comes and denies it wholly, and puts himself
upon your tongues concerning this for good and evil; and therefore we charge
you by the faith ye owe to God, and by the oath which you have taken, that
ye make us to know the truth thereon, and omit not for fear or love or hate,
but having only (the fear of) God before your eyes . . .", etc. FORSYTH,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 206, 207.
8. "The twelve knights may either say, directly and shortly, that one party
or the other has the greater right, or merely set forth the facts and thus enable
the justices to say it-what we call a special verdict." Thayer, TIho Jury and
Its Development (1892) 5 HARv. L. REv. 249, 261.
"'While the juror's oath,' said Bracton, 'has in it three associated things
(comites) truth, justice and judgment, it is truth that is to be found in the
juror, justitia et judicium in the judge. But sometimes judgment seems to
belong to jurors since they are to say on their oath, yet according to their
belief, whether so and so disseised so and so, or not'." THAYER, PR EJIMINAY
TREATISE ON EvIDENCE (1898) 195, citing Bracton, f. 186 b.
9. WESTMINSTER II (13 EDW. I) c. 30 (1285) (from Statutes at Large,
Owen Ruffhead, 1763) "II, . . . (4) And also it is ordained, That the Justicen
assigned to take Assises shall not compel the jurors to say precisely whether
it be Disseisin, or not, so that they shew the Truth of the Deed, and require aid
of the Justices. (5) But if they of their own Head will say, that it-is Disseisin,
their verdict shall be admitted at their own Peril."
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The use of the attaint while known as early as the eleventh
century,10 seems not to have extended to all actions in the thirteenth."
Its application was gradually enlarged by successive statutes,"- until
in 1360 it was finally provided "that every man against whom they
[the jurors] shall pass may have the attaint both in pleas real and
personal, even those too poor to pay a fee for it." 13 But the pre-
valence of 'perjured' verdicts continued despite all statutes. It was
felt that the juries were primarily at fault, not the directions of
the judges, 14 although there were occasions when the judges also
were taken to task.'0 As the law progressed in refinement, the
judges, chafed no doubt by the realization of their superiority as
experts, began using the threat of the attaint to affright the juries
into rendering special verdicts. Attaint as a method of control
was not entirely effective, however, because the gentlemen preferred
to pay a mean fine rather than meet to slander and deface the
honest yeomen, their neighbours.'0 Its utility gradually declined
although measures were passed from time to time in the hope that
by making the punishment less rigorous, the attainting jury would
be encouraged to meet and chasten the 'honest yeomen'.' T
In criminal cases the fine seems not to have functioned much
better than the attaint. There are a number of instances 18 where
the jury was fined for going against the direction of the court "but
these doings were even then accounted very violent, tyrannical and
contrary to the liberty and custom of the realm of England". And
often the juries were not afraid to "take the bit in mouth and go
head-strong against the Court", much to the disgust and fury of
some of the judges.' 9
10. Gundulf v. Pichot (Big. P1. A. N.) 34 (1879) cited and summarized
by Thayer, The Jury and Its Dcclopment, supra note 8, at 253; also sum-
marized and discussed in FOaSYTH, op." cit. supra note 3, at 100 et ocq.
11. Y. B. Trin. 20 Edw. I, f. 18 (1291). "Note, after the Great Assise an
Attaint never lies." See also Brac. N. B. II, case 350 (1229).
12. WESTMINSTER I (3 Edw. I) c. 38 (1274); 5 EDW. I, c. 7 (1331); 28
EDW. III, c. 8 (1354). See also 3 BL. CoMi. *403, 404.
13. 34 EDW. III, c. 7 (1360).
14. 11 HEN. VI, c. 4 (1433); 15 HEN. VI, e. 5 (1436).
15. Brac. N. B. II, case 564 (1231); Brac. N. B. III, case 1106 (1235); 3
BL. Comm. *409.
16. Com. of England, Book III, c. 2; 3 Blackstone *404, Bright v. Eynon, 1
Burr. 390 (Mansfield, 1757).
17. 11 HEN. VII, c. 21 (1495); 11 HEN. VII, c. 24 (1495); 23 HEN. VIII,
c. 3 (1531); 13 ELiz. c. 25 (1571).
18. 1 How. St. Tr. 862, 869 (1554); T. Raymond 98 (K. B. 1664); Hardres
409 (Ex. 1665); Kelyng 50 (K. B. 1666); 2 Keble 180 (K. B. 1667); 6 Ho's.
St. Tr. 951 (1670) (Penn & Mead's case).
19. 1 Keble 864 (K. B. 1665).
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In 1670 came Vaughan's memorable decision in Bushel's Case and
in 1688 came the Revolution. Just how far this decision is a reflec-
tion of the then current thought is a matter for conjecture. Certain
it is that for the next two centuries more and more dependence
was placed on the jury. Heretofore, since it was necessary to trust
either court or jury, there had been practically no question of the
proper supremacy of- the court. That there should be a specific
remedy as a matter of right for the invasion of the 'province' of
the jury was practically unheard of.20 The question had been viewed
wholly from the perspective of the propriety of special verdicts as
a means of giving the judges some voice in the application of the
law. "The precedents run all for trust on the side of the court."
But now the respective provinces had to be determined since this
revolutionary decision had entirely splintered both principal clubs
which the judges had been wont to wield as threats to the jury,
the attaint and the fine.
In the course of his opinion Vaughan examined the maxim 21 that
questions of law are for the court and questions of fact for the
jury. It might be well to pause and briefly to trace the origin of
this concept. So far as this writer can ascertain, the first clear
enunciation of the principle was made by Plowden in his report of
Townsend's Case wherein he comments "For the office of 12 men is
no other than to enquire of Matters of Fact and not to adjudge what
the Law is, for that is the Office of the Court and not of the Jury.
i" 2 And although the same idea was voiced by other writers
of that and the immediately succeeding period,23 it remained for
Coke to turn it into that neat phraseology, the magic of which hag
captivated lawyers and judges from that day to this. It may be
found in his report of Heydon's Case,24 Altham's Case, 25 Dowman's
Case,2 1 Abbott of Strata Mercella's Case,27 Priddle and Napper's
20. Since the Statute of WESTMINSTER Ii (13 Edw. I) c. 31. (1285), there
had been provision for excepting to the judge's direction which on rare occasions
had been availed of but never as being an invasion of the province of the jury.
See also 3 CoKE, LAW OF ENGLAND *1556 (Thomas ed. 1836, p. 365, n. 7)
(Hargrave's ed. 1794, *1556, n. 5).
21. Vaughan 135, 149 (C. P. 1670):
22. 1 Plowden 110a, 114a (K. B. 1554).
23. Hobart 53 (K. B. 1615); Dyer 362a 15 (K. B. 1557); Moore 105 (K. B.
1575); Hard. 16 (Ex. 1655); 2 Bulst. 314 (K. B. 1614).
24. 2 Co. Rep., pt. 4, 41a, 42b (K. B. 1585).
25. 4 Co. Rep., pt. 8, 150b (K. B. 1610).
26. 5 Co. Rep., pt. 9, 7b, 13a (K. B. 1585).
27. 5 Co. Rep., pt. 9, 23b, 25a (K. B. 1591).
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Case,28 in his commentary on Littleton,2 9 and in his Law of England.-C
But even though Coke had stated it repeatedly, Vaughan was not
ready to accept it as an abstract principle of functional delimitation.
Since the jury often had knowledge of facts not brought out in
court, he thought it obvious that they were best fitted to decide
them. But even though he recognized that the jury was incapable
of deciding the law, he nevertheless insisted that whenever a verdict
was returned upon general issues "they resolve the law and the
fact complicately." 31
After the Revolution the fight for the ascendancy of the jury's
power continued. Then indeed did it become the bulwark of liberty
and the palladium of the rights of freemen in the war with tyrannical
judges. Eventually the fight crystallized around trials for libel,32
and the great Mansfield, in upholding his directions to juries, be-
came involved in the attack led by Camden, Erskine and Fox, and
was made a target of "that common slanderer Junius". 3 The Society
for Constitutional Information published and distributed its tract
for the information of juries on their "rights under the constitu-
tion"'. 4  The pot was boiling. The House of Lords submitted the
questions which had arisen as to libels to all the judges and after
they had reported a view substantially in accord with that thereto-
fore announced by Lord lansfield, the Fox Libel Bill was tardily
passed in 1792.35 In the meantime the United States of America
had come into being and the provinces of judge and jury were
there also in process of delimitation. But before turning to this
country, another development in English law should be noted-
that of granting new trials.
Blackstone says, "The exertion of these superintendent powers
of the king's courts, in setting aside the verdict of a jury and
28. 6 Co. Rep., pt. 11, 8b, 10b (K. B. 1612).
29. Co. LrrT. 2-228b (2 Hargreave's ed. 1794).
30. *155b (3 Thbmas ed. (1836) p. 365).
31. Supra note 21, at 149, 150.
32. Seven Bishop's case, 12 How. St. Tr. 183 (1688); Bayard's case, 14
How. St. Tr. 471, 502 (1702); Fuller's case, 14 id 517 (1702); Tutchin's case,
14 id. 1095 (1704); Francklins' case, 17 id. 625 (1731); Owen's case, 18 id.
1203 (1752); Almon's case, 20 id. 803 (1770); Miller's case, 20 id. 869 (1770);
Woodfall's case, 20 id- 895 (1770); Dean of St. Asaph's case, 21 id. 847 (1784).
See note in 8 How. St. Tr. 35 (1860).
33. For a full discussion of Lord Mansfield's part see FOUSYH. op. cit.
supra note 2, c. XII.
34. Copy set out in full in account of Dean of St. Asaph's case, supra note
32, at 850. This was the case in which the famous Erskine distinguished
himself as the champion of liberty.
35. 32 GEO. III, c. 60 (1791).
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granting a new trial, on account of misbehavior in the jurors, is
of a date extremely ancient. There are instances in the Year-Books
of the reigns of Edward III, Henry IV, and Henry VII of judgments
being stayed (even after a trial at bar) and new venires awarded,
because the jury had eat and drank without consent of the judge,
and because the plaintiff had privately given a paper to a juryman
before he was sworn. And upon these the chief justice Glynn, in
1655, grounded the first precedent that is reported in our books for
granting a new trial upon account of excessive damages given by
the jury." 30
In this first precedent,37 the actual ground for granting the new
trial is significant. "If the court do believe that the jury gave a
verdict against their direction, they may grant a new trial." The
particular in which the jury had gone against direction was in
giving excessive damages; yet in the earlier days it had not been
thought necessary to have a new trial for excessive damages, the
damages being summarily moderated at the discretion of the judge
without regard to the jury's verdict. But that was done to avoid
and to relieve from possible attaint of the jury,8 and the attaint
was now in desuetude.
After Bushel's Case, the new trial became more and more popular
although it took some time to realize its possibilities in connection
with instructions as a method of control. But after the agitation
of the succeeding century on the right of the jury to decide the law,
its potentialities were fully sounded. The common law courts were
at first somewhat reluctant, but besides Vaughan's decision and
the general heresy of jurors there was the arrogative Chancery to
be considered: 39 "Juries are wilful enough and denying a new
trial here will but send parties into the Chancery." 410
Coeval with the granting of new trials on the ground of failure
to observe the directions of the court was the development of com-
plete separation of witness and jury,41 a necessity more pronounced
36. 3 BL. Comm. *387, 388, citing the instance in the Year Books: 24 EDW.
III, 24 (Trin. 1359); 11 HEN. IV, 18 (Mich. 1409); 14 HEN. VII. 1 (Mich.
1498).
37. Wood v. Gunston, Style 462 (K. B. 1655).
38. Bracton IV, tr. 1, c. 19, § 8 and Bracton IV, tr. 5, c. 4. Cited in 3 BL.
COMm. *389.
39. 3 BL. CoMm. *388.
40. Martyn and Jackson, 3 Keble 398 (K. B. 1674). "Twisden and Wild
refused to grant it, the jury being judges of the fact, though verdict bo against
the evidence, it is not to be set aside without a new law" but Rainsford, C. J.,
favored granting a new trial on account of the Chancery.
41. Style 253 (K. B. 1650), 2 Salk 405 (K. B. 1702).
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after Vaughan's decision which still acknowledged the possibility of
the jury having information not otherwise known to the court.
By 1773 the practice of granting new trials on account of mis-
direction by the court or the jury's failure to follow its directions,
seems to have been well established and encouraged. We find Lord
Chief Justice DeGrey prefacing an opinion with:
"I have always considered this mode of application for a new trial as
very satisfactory to the suitors, who may be injured by mistakes; and
likewise to the jury, as it reforms their errors, if they commit any and
is a happy substitute for the much more grievous proceeding that the
common law directed. . . . It is possible that in many instances that
mistake may arise from the direction of the Court; for the Court may
direct the jury to attend to a circumstance that in point of law is not
proved, or is not the subject-matter for their consideration; or it is possible
that the jury may mistake the evidence as to believe the fact to be true,
when it is not so; then it comes to be a proper motion for a new trial,
because the verdict is contrary to the evidence." 42
Developments in America proceeded along the same general lines.
Appendix II of Quincy's Reports (Massachusetts) concludes:
"It is worthy of notice how the history of this question [the powers and
rights of juries] after the English Revolution of 1688 repeated itself
in America nearly a century later. The great constitutional lawyers
and judges of either Revolutionary period-Somers and Holt; Adams,
Jay, Wilson, Iredell, Chase, Marshall, Hamilton, Parsons and Kent-
with one voice maintained the right of the jury upon the general issue to
judge of the law as well as the fact. But they had hardly passed away,
or fifty years elapsed since either Revolution, when the courts of the
new government began to assert as much control over the consciences of
the jury, as had been claimed by the most arbitrary judges of the Monarch
whom that Revolution had overthrown." 43
The rights and powers of juries were tested in libels in colonial
America as well as in England. The trial of John Peter Zenger,
printer, before Hon. James de Lancey, Esq., Chief Justice of the
Province of New York in 1735, "made a great noise in the world,"
and one Mr. Hamilton, a Philadelphia lawyer, successfully argued
both law and fact to the jury despite the protest of the Chief Justice.
John Adams did not fare so well as counsel in a civil action for
libel in 1767 when he attempted to argue to the jury whether the
words were actionable or not. Justices Lynde, Cushing, Oliver and
Trowbridge, of the Massachusetts Bay Province, would not permit
42. Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 20 How. St. Tr. 82, 175 (1773).
43. Quincy, op. cit. supra note 2, at 559.
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it. But in the Trial of the British Soldiers, although the same Justice
Trowbridge instructed the jury that they were to take the law
from the Court, John Adams nevertheless argued the law at length
to the jury and continued thereafter in the opinion that juries may
decide the law even in civil cases notwithstanding the instructions
of the court.
In America by the time of the Revolution and for some time there-
after, the power to decide the law in criminal cases seems to have
been almost universally accorded the jury and quite generally, it
determined the law in civil cases.44 Chief Justice Jay in 1794 in a
civil cause "regarded as of first importance," instructed the jury on
"the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury,
on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must
be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable
distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon
yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact
in controversy. On this and on every other occasion, however, we have no
doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court:
For, as on the one hand, it is presumed that juries are the best judges of
facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable that the court are the best
judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully within your power
of decision." 45
And in the next year Justice Iredell digressed to remark that even
though instructed by the court to find for the defendant, much as
they may respect the sentiments of the court on points of law, "they
are not bound to deliver a verdict conformably to them." 46
Already 'some one had conceived the utility of distinguishing be-
tween power and right but Justice James Kent smashed it such a
blow that it did not show signs of recovery in New York for some
years. He found it impossible to meet the stream of authority that
the jury can make up a verdict of fact and law against all direction
of the judge. And as for denying that they can rightfully and
lawfully exercise such a power without "compromitting their con-
sciences," the law must
"have intended in granting this power to a jury, to grant them a lawful
and rightful power, oi it would have provided a remedy against the
undue exercise of it. The true criterion of a legal power, is its capacity
to produce a definitive effect liable neither to censure nor review. And
the verdict of not guilty, in a criminal case, is, in every respect absolutely
44. For a full discussion see Quincy op. cit. supra note 2, at 567 ot seq.
45. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 4 (1794).
46. Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 Dall. 19, 33 (1795).
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
final. The jury are not liable to punishment, nor the verdict to control.
No attaint lies, nor can a new trial be awarded. The exercise of this
power in the jury has been sanctioned, and upheld in constant activity,
from the earliest ages." 47
He admitted however that in civil cases, the opinion of the court
on questions of law ought ultimately to be enforced by the power of
setting aside the verdict and granting new trials. 8
There is small room for doubt that the jury reached its zenith
before 1835, when Justice Story, as circuit judge, instructing a
jury, made a point upon which he had had a decided opinion during
his whole professional life. He said that regardless of physical
power and the necessity of compounding law and fact, the jury had
no moral right to decide the law according to their own notions.
On the contrary, he held it the most sacred constitutional right of
every party accused of crime that the jury should respond as to the
facts and the court as to the law. Indeed, he said that if he had
thought otherwise, he would abstain from instructing them on the
law at all. 49
The heyday of the appellate courts had arrived. The reversal
of the lower courts and the granting of new trials had become a
common-place. The fear of judges had passed.50  But the jury
proponents did not surrender without a struggle. In Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and New York, the contest was particularly pro-
longed.51 Vermont, too, attempted to stem the tide.G2
It would be interesting and no doubt possible to correlate to an
unusual degree the rise and fall of the notion of the necessity of jury
supremacy with the advance and recession of the frontier in its
47. People v. Croswell, 3 John. Cas. *337, *356 (N. Y. 1804).
48. Id. at *376.
49. U. S. v. Battiste, Fed. Cas. No. 14545 (1835).
50. Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 396 (1856); see Sparf v. United States,
156 U. S. 51, 90 (1895).
51. Massachusetts: Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 25 (1808); Commonwealth
v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304 (1825); Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 477, 49G
(1830); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, 227 (1838); Commonwealth
v. Porter, 10 Mete. 263 (1845); Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 Gray 303, note
(1855); Commonwealth v. Rock, 10 Gray 4 (1857). New York: People v.
Croswell, supra note 47; People v. Thayer, 1 Parker C. C. 595 (1825); People
v. Videto, id. 603 (1825); People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566 (1848); Carpenter v.
People, 8 Barb. 603, 611 (1850); Pennsylvania: Albertson's Lessee v. Robeson,
I fail. 9 (1764); Wilcox v. Henry, 1 fall. 69, 71 (1782); Pennsylvania v. Bell,
Addison R. 156, 160, 161 (1793); Guffy v. Commonwealth, 2 Grant 66, 68
(1853).
52. See the majority and dissenting opinions in State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14
(1849).
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progress through the various states. The last frontier faded out
in the nineties and it is significant perhaps that during that decade
the question was finally refined and resolved into its present status.
During that period there stand out three compelling decisions in
the cases of Commonwealth v. McManus,53 State v. Burpee,54 and
Sparf et al. v. United States, 5 in each of which there was dissent.
While the provinces of court and jury were being defined by the
judiciary, the legislatures had not been inactive. Among other
problems which had received the attention of the latter, was the
need of accurately recording just what the judges had stated the
law to be so that appellate courts might know certainly 50 whether
the juries had failed to follow it. Under the common law, instruc-
tions were oral 5 and before the statutory change it was incumbent
upon the person excepting to get them reduced to writing, for
recordation was discretionary with the trial judge. 8
The requirement that instructions be written, 9 innocent enough
in its avowed objective, has furnished one of the most effective
53. 143 Pa. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. 761 (1891).
54. 65 Vt. 1, 25 Ati. 964 (1892).
55. Supra note 50.
56. People v. Hersey, 53 Cal. 574 (1879).
57. See Vicksburg Rr. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545 (1886). "In the
courts of the United States, as in those of England, from which our practice
was derived, the judge, in submitting a case to a jury, may at his discretion,
whenever he thinks fit to assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment
upon the evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks important,
and express his opinion on the facts . .
58. Smith v. Crichton, 33 Md. 103 (1870).
59. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 9508; ARIZ. CODE (Struckmeyor, 1928)
§§ 3809, 3810; ARK. CONST. of 1874 Art. VII § 23; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deoring,
1931) § 1127c; and CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. (Deering, 1931) § 608; CoL0 ANN.
STAT. (Mills, 1930) §§ 2214, 2215; FLA. CoiiP. LAWS (1927) §§ 4364, 4365;
GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4847; IDAHO Comp. STAT. (1919) § 6847; IL,. REV.
STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 110, § 73; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burn's, 1926) § 584,
cl. 5; IowA CODE (1931) §§ 11491, 11506; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) §
60-2909 cl. 5; Ky. CODE ANN. (Carroll, 1927) Civ. Prac. § 317, cl. 5, Crm.
Prac. § 225; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE (Dart, 1932) art. 515; ME. REV. STAT. (1930)
c. 96, § 104; MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 586; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) Civ. §
967, Crim. § 3694; MONT. REv. CODE (1921) Civ. § 9349, Pen. § 11969; Nnro
ComP. STAT. (1929) §§ 20-1107, 20-1111, 29-2016; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Court-
right, 1929) §§ 70-104, 70-108; N. C. CODE (1931) § 566; OHIO GEN. CODE
(Page, 1926) § 11447; N. D. Comr. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 7620, 10822; OnE.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 2-301, cl. 6; TENN. CODE (1932) Civ. §§ 8809, 8810, Crim.
§§ 11749, 11750; TEX. ANN. CIV. & CRIM. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Civ. §§ 2184,
2185, Crim. §§ 658, 659, 663; UTAH COMP. LAWS (1917) Civ. § 6802, Crim.
§ 8975; WASH. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§ 339, 2158; W. VA. CODI
(1931) c. 56, art. 6, § 19; WIs. STAT. (1931) §§ 270-271; Wyo. REV. STAT.
(1931) Civ. § 89-1306, cl. 6, Crim. § 33-902, cl. 6. (While a number of these
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devices for the supremacy of appellate courts, not only in the control
of the jury but of the trial court as well. By means of interpretative
rules as to the giving and refusing of instructions, and the form
and necessity of written instructions, many of the attempted lines
of cleavage between law and fact and the provinces of court and
jury, have been drawn. Since the court's province was the law,
it was quite logically provided in the majority of the states either
by statute, judicial decisions or constitutional enactment that in
giving the instructions, the court should not charge the jury with
respect to the facts or the weight to be accorded them.c
At last this troublesome phase of administration had been co-
ordinated, articulated and perfected--or so it may have been thought.
Each branch of the administration now had seemingly a well-defined
province of activity.
I
The Theoretical Function of Ivstructions to Enlighten
- the Jury on the Lazo
On the theory that at the end of a hearing the court is cognizant
of the legal issues in question, and the jury is in full possession of
the relevant facts, nothing would seem more simple than for the
statutes make written instructions mandatory, others provide that they shall
be reduced to writing upon request of either party.)
60. Daniel v. Wade, 203 Ala. 355, 83 So. 99 (1919); Southern Pacific Rr.
v. Hogan, 13 Ariz. 34, 108 Pac. 240 (1910); Free v. Maxwell, 138 Ark. 489,
212 S. W. 325 (1919); McNeil v. Barney, 51 Cal. 603 (1877) (See also CAL.
CoNsT. art. VI, § 19); Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co., 62 Fla. 166, 57 So.
233 (1911); Owen v. Palmour, 111 Ga. 885, 36 S. E. 969 (1900); Jennings v.
Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 195 i1. App. 543 (1915); Virgin v. Lake Erie &
Western Rr. Co., 55 Ind. App. 216, 101 N. E. 500 (1913); Carroll v. Chicago,
St. Paul Rr. Co., 103 Iowa 134, 84 N. W. 1035 (1901); Ennis-Bayard Petroleum
Co. v. Mill & Elevator Co., 118 Kan. 202, 235 Pac. 119 (1925); Louisiana &
Northern Rr. Co. v. Lynch, 137 Ky. 696, 126 S. W. 362 (1910); State v. King,
135 La. 117, 64 So. 1007 (1914); Hayden v. Me. Central Rr. Co., 118 Me. 442,
108 Ati. 681 (1920); Western Mid. Rr. Co. v. Shivers, 101 Did. 391, 61 AtI.
618 (1905); Davis v. Jenney, 42 Mlass. 221 (1840); Kearney v. State, 68 Miss.
233, 8 So. 292 (1890); Winter v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 96 Mo.
App. 1, 69 S. W. 662 (1902); State v. Mahoney, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647
(1900); Hanika v. Lincoln Trac. Co., 98 Neb. 583, 153 N. W. 568 (1915);
Victor American Fuel Co. v. Melkusch, 24 N. M. 47, 173 Pac. 198 (1918);
Ray v. Patterson, 170 N. C. 226, 87 S. E. 212 (1915); Commercial Security Co.
v. Jolly, 103 Okla. 8, 229 Pac. 193 (1924); State v. McAllister, 67 Ore. 480,
136 Pac. 354 (1913); Moore v. Cummings, 87 S. C. 166, 69 S. E. 154 (1910);
Fellows v. Christensen, 28 S. D. 353, 133 N. W. 814 (1911); Earp v. Edington,
107 Tenn. 23, 64 S. W. 40 (1901); Kansas City Rr. Co. v. Corn, 186 S. W. 807
(Tex Civ. App. 1916); Schuyler v. Southern Pacific Rr. Co., 37 Utah 581, 109
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court to announce the law appropriate to the occasion and for the
jury thereupon to reach a just verdict by applying it. This is the
theory of instructions. Their avowed function is to state the sub-
stantive law as a text-book for the jury against a back-ground of
the individual case, with due care not to make it abstract and at
the same time not to be so particular as to trench on the facts.
That this of course is practically a physical impossibility, is easily
apprehended. Consequently, the trial judge undertakes to give an
exposition of the principles of law appropriate to the case,01 restricted
to the matters in issue, 62 in such manner as to be readily understood
by the mind untrained in the law. 3 The issues must be presented
in the most intelligible form,64 and the principles of evidence sug-
gested wherever necessary. 5 The sum total must be addressed to
the facts to be found by the jury,66 in order to enable them better to
understand their duty and to prevent them from arriving at wrong
conclusions. But nevertheless care must be taken not to overstep
the plain boundary that separates the provinces of court and jury. 7
Taking some such operating theorem as the foregoing, the standard
works treating of instructions proceed to reduce it to its logical
heads and sub-heads. But regardless of the particular choice of
topical analysis, it will be readily seen from a perusal of the cases
that, except for the matter based on necessity for written instructions
and the procedure in excepting, the crux of instructional adminis-
tration lies in the constant attempt at description of the elusive
lines of demarcation between law and fact, the duty of the court to
give the law applicable to the particular case without invading the
province of the jury, and the duty of the jury to receive that law
and obediently apply it to the proper facts. And to make bad
matters worse there is the apparent occasional compromise when
Pac. 458 (1910); Guntner v. Hughes, 143 Va. 36, 129 S. E. 239 (1025); State
v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800 (1883); Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. W.
596 (1901), and see Wis. CONST. art. 5, § 26.
61. Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 541, 23 N. E. 670 (1889); Terry v. Daven-
port, 170 Ind. 74, 83 N. E. 636 (1908).
62. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Thurman, 110 Ark.
188, 161 S. W. 1054 (1913).
63. Pagels v. Meyer, 193 Ill. 172, 61 N. E. 1111 (1901).
64. Owen v. Owen, 22 Iowa 270 (1867); Louisiana & Northern Rr. Co. v.
King's Adm'r., 131 Ky. 347, 115 S. W. 196 (1909).
65. Souvais v. Leavitt, 50 Mich. 108, 15 N. W. 37 (1883); Welch v. Ware,
32 Mich. 77 (1875).
66. Hanson v. Kent & Purdy Co., 36 Okla. 583, 129 Pac. 7 (1912); Rio
Grande Southern Rr. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Colo. 1, 96 Pac. 986 (1908).
67. Gillett v. Webb, 17 Ill. App. 458 (1885).
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the court may submit so-called mixed questions of law and fact to
the jury under proper instruction.8
After a reading of the ordinary materials on instructions one
is impressed with the distinct hazard of asking for any instructions
whatsoever. Of course the great variety of procedure in obtaining
instructions-varying from the rule in M1ississippi, 0 where the court
is forbidden to give any instructions not asked for, to the practice
in the federal courts, where the court is allowed the utmost leeway-
tends to accentuate the confusion and to make difficult a general
treatment of the rules. But aside from this, the refinement of the
larger principles themselves appear to be such as to make an in-
struction that escapes Scylla fall directly into Charybdis: For an
example, take one principle-the relation of the pleadings and
evidence.
In general, the instructions must be within the purview of the
pleadings and predicated thereupon. 70 They must be neither broader
nor narrower than the pleadings nor suggestive of issues not raised
thereby71  These issues must be restricted further to those raised
and supported by the evidence,72 and care must be exercised not to
assume the existence or non-existence of any facts.73 Yet there
must be no omission or exclusion of any issues, theories, or defenses,
even though the evidence is very slight. 4 And the whole must be
so balanced as neither to give undue prominence to particular evi-
dence, theories or issues, 75 nor to call specific attention to the claims
68. For example: "The submission of the question (proximate cause] to
the sound discretion of the jury, under proper instructions, was a disposition
of the case in harmony with the long line of authorities cited by counsel on
both sides." Chester Nat' Bank v. Southern Pipe Line Co., 40 Pa. Sup. Ct.
87, 96 (1909). This is probably of most common occurrence today in negli-
gence cases.
69. Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 586; see Watkins v. State, 60 Miss. 323
(1882).
70. Degonia v. St. Louis Rr. Co., 224 Mo. 564, 123 S. W. 807 (1909); Graey
v. Atlantic Rr. Co., 53 Fla. 350, 42 So. 903 (1907); Healea v. Keenan, Ex'r,
244 fll. 484, 91 N. E. 646 (1910); Tullis v. Chase & Co., 162 Iowa, 264, 144
N. W. 17 (1913); Bowlin v. Archer, 157 Ky. 540, 163 S. W. 477 (1914); Riley
v. City of Independence, 258 Mo. 671, 167 S. W. 1022 (1914) ; Swift v. Holoubek,
60 Neb. 784, 84 N. W. 249 (1900); Kirk v. Territory, 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 797
(1900); Barker v. Coats, 34 S. D. 291, 148 N. W. 134 (1914); Smith v. Clark,
37 Utah 116, 106 Pac. 653 (1910).
71. See I BLASHFIELD, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (1916) 177, n. 39 for a
compilation of authorities.
72. Id. at 183, n. 67.
73. Id. at 233, n. 2.
-74. Id. at 218, n. 1.
75. Id. at 335, n. 1.
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of one without adverting to the corresponding claims of the other
party.
76
When one considers the apparent nicety required in framing an
instruction that will conform to the above very small portion of
the law of instructions pitfalls seem inescapable. But when there
is added the myriad of rules having to do with credibility of wit-
nesses, presumptions, circumstantial evidence, degrees of proof, com-
menting on the weight of the evidence or the sufficiency of it, caution-
ary instructions, etc.,-then one is tempted to picture the trial judge's
task as beset with the difficulties confronting an amateur tight-rope
walker.
The net result, however, is not to bring the trial judge into
disrepute, but rather to give unexpected functions to instructions-
to furnish trial judges with a means of controlling the jury and to
provide appellate courts with an instrument whereby they control
both the trial court and the jury.
Although, under our system, it is deemed essential that instructions
be made intelligible to a jury,77 there is no requirement that they be
useful to a jury.78 Whether or not they can be useful to a jury will
depend primarily upon whether the crystallization of the law of the
76. Hayes v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 195 Pa. St. 184, 45 Atl. 925 (1900);
Flowers v. Flowers, 92 Ga. 688, 18 S. E. 1006 (1893); Banner v. Schlessinger,
109 Mich. 262, 67 N. W. 116 (1896); Prine v. State, 73 Miss. 838, 19 So. 711
(1896).
77. The function of instructions to serve as a guide to substantive prin-
ciples of law, is well-recognized. This is attested by the general requirement
of separate findings of fact and specific declaration of law where the case is
tried without a jury. In at least one state (Maryland) it is required that
the court instruct itself as a jury. It is quite essential that the reviewing
court have access to the theories on which the case was tried. See Alexander
v. Capital Paint Co., 136 Md. 658, 111 Atl. 140 (1920); Richardson v. Ander-
son, 109 Md. 641, 72 Atl. 485 (1909); Murphy v. Smith, 112 Ill, App. 404
(1903); Harbison v. School District, 89 Mo. 184, 1 S. W. 30 (1886); White v.
Black, 115 Mo. App. 28, 90 S. W. 1153 (1905); McKeon v. McDermott, 22 Cal.
667 (1863); Shuler v. Lashhorn, 67 Kan. 694, 74 Pac. 264 (1903); Jennings v.
Frazier, 46 Ore. 470, 80 Pac. 1011 (1905); Kinn v. Nat'l Bank, 118 Wis. 537,
95 N. W. 969 (1903).
78. "As I write these lines I hear that a very learned committee of the
American Bar is engaged on a re-statement of the law of torts. Nothing but
good can come of this if it is borne in mind that the object of any such state-
ment is not to effect a verbal reconciliation of all the authorities but to frame
such a rule as a well-informed Court of last resort might lay down; and that,
if in any case the result is a proposition which cannot be made intelligible to
a jury, there is like to be something wrong either with the drafting (which
should not happen to a cominittee including such expert draftsmen) or with




subject is such that its rules may be reduced to intelligible propo-
sitions. Take for comparison, the following two types of instructions
as illustrative:
(1) "The court instructs the jury that if the plaintiffs were taken over
the farm by the defendants or (and) were shown the bounds so that the
plaintiffs knew where the farm was and what was comprised within the
bounds, it would not be of any consequence that representations may have
been made by the defendants in relation to acreage." 79
This instruction serves as a definite statement of the doctrine of
caveat emptor in the law of vendor and purchaser. When any given
phase of the law is in such status that it is capable of being reduced
to such a criterion then it has at least some degree of predictability
and applicable content. But consider the next:
(2) "Eyery person is negligent when, without intending to do any
wrong, he does such an act or omits to take such precaution that under
the circumstances he, as an ordinarily prudent person, ought reasonably
to foresee that he will thereby expose the interests of another to an
unreasonable risk of harm. In determining whether his conduct will
subject the interests of another to an unreasonable risk of harm, a
person is required to take into account such of the surrounding circum-
stances as would be taken into account by a reasonably prudent person
and possess such knowledge as is possessed by an ordinarily reasonable
person and to use such judgment and discretion as is exercised by persons
of reasonable intelligence under the same or similar circumstances." 80
This instruction was devised by Chief Justice Rosenberry in a very
scholarly attempt, based on the Restatement of Negligence and
other works, to re-define negligence in terms of wrongful invasion
of legally protected interests and the consequences thereof. It was
offered as preferable to an instruction approved in a previous case,8'
which was criticized because it indicated "no standard by which
the conduct of the defendant is to be measured"!
It is unnecessary to call attention to the fact that this instruction
makes the purported standard the ordinarily prudent person, with
the foresight, knowledge, judgment, discretion and intelligence of
a reasonable man. This means that the jury, despite all efforts to
the contrary, fixes the standard of law which it will apply to the
facts, or at least that if the jurors pay any attention to the in-
struction at all, they will use themselves as the standards by which
79. Mabardy v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148, 88 N. E. 894 (1909i).
80. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N. W. 372 (1931).
81. Hamus v. Weber, 199 Wis. 320, 226 N. W. 392 (1929).
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to judge the negligence of the defendant.8 2 But appellate courts
do not really permit the jury to fix the standard, however much
they may appear to.83  On appeal judges set themselves up as
ordinarily prudent men and arrive at their decision accordingly,
though they may reason it in terms of metaphysical distinctions.
The standard loses all objectivity 84 as this ordinarily prudent person
fades into coincidence with the personality of the one judging, pro-
jected by imagination into the "same or similar circumstances",
and becomes of little value as a principle guiding the jury.
Concerning the first illustrative instruction there may be differ-
ences of opinion as to what the law ought to be but there can be
little room for doubt as to what the court has declared the law is.
The factual issue is clear cut and its determination will automatically
apply the law on account of the wording of the instruction. The
respective functions of court and jury in actuality approach
theoretical purpose. The verdict of the jury must necessarily reflect
the finding of fact.
II
The Function of Instructions as A Method by Which Appellate
Courts Control Juries and Trial Courts
Except for the hectic years immediately preceding and succeeding
the Revolution of 1688, the English trial judges have exercised quite
candidly a moderate and approved control over the jury. So it is
with no surprise that we read in one of the early texts that:
"It is the practice for the judge at nisi prius not only to state to the
jury all the evidence that has been given but to comment on its bearing
and weight, and to state the legal rules upon the subject and their
application to the particular case, and even to advise them as regards
the verdict they should give, so that it may be in accord with his view
of the law and justice; so that in effect, in general, the jury only give
their opinion on the existence of the facts, and even then, in general, they
follow the advice of the judge, and therefore in substance, the verdict is
found or anticipated by the judge's direction, except indeed, as regards the
amount of damages, and which also are greatly influenced by the observa-
82. See Freeman v. Adams, 63 Cal. App. 225, 218 Pac. 600 (1923). But
see Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408 (1891); and see discussion in
GIEN, JUDGn AND JURY (1930) c. v, The Negligence Issue.
83. Of. GREnx, op. cit. supra note 82, at 69, The Duty Problem.




tions of the judge, or may be corrected, if excessive or too small, by the
Court in Banc." 5
The pronounced fear and distrust of the power of judges evinced
by the democratic temper, resulting in England in the mere passage
of Fox's Libel Bill, found expression in America in innumerable
statutes and constitutional provisions attempting to safeguard the
power of juries in general. Moreover, England, despite its Revolu-
tion, never felt the sway of the spirit of the frontiersman to whom
submission to any kind of court was to an eoxtent a magnanimous
compromise of individual sovereignty.
Shams permit the growth of social habits without revolutionary
change. It is trite to say that this is the secret of the adaptability
of the common law procedure. American courts could not forth-
rightly overturn constitutional and statutory dogma that questions
of fact are for the jury, and, as pointed out by Dean Green,sc they
least of all now are desirous of such drastic change. By upholding
this sham, the appellate courts have been enabled actually to trans-
form it into one of their most effective methods of control of both
trial judges and juries.
It is possible that some of those who decry the use of juries and
long for more power in the judges believe too literally the pro-
nouncements of prohibitive strictures in decisions. It is an almost
universal rule, imposed either by stare decisis or statute, that on
appeal the court shall- not weigh the evidence or, stated differently,
that the findings of fact by a jury are binding and final. Yet this
does not impede in any wise the examination of the instructions
employed in the lower court. The court on appeal does not consider
the verdict proper. Instead it philosophizes on whether or not the
jury might have been misled by the error in the statement of the
law, or whether or not they might have been influenced by an
instruction which trenched in some manner on the province of fact,
or whether or not they might have found differently had some
requested instruction been given. The decision is that the learned
trial judge erred in giving Instruction No. 12 or in refusing
Instruction No. 18 and therefore the judgment should be reversed
and a new trial granted.
On the other hand, if no fault can possibly be found with the
ritual, which is well-nigh inconceivable, the appellate court which
85. 3 CTrTY's GUxRAL PRAcTcic (1836) 913. "Indeed without this assis-
tance'from the learned judge, few juries would, in a contested cause, be able to
come to an unanimous opinion, being frequently left in a state of great per-
plexity by the influence of speeches of the contending leaders."
86. GREza, op. cit. supra note 82, at 375-376.
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trusts in the constitution but keeps its powder dry, has no qualms of
conscience about discovering that the jury manifestly failed to
observe the directions of the trial judge-and this of course is strictly
a matter of law and not of fact.
There are a number of other devices by which appellate courts
have wrested control from trial judges and juries, but were they all
abolished, it is probable that the errors of misdirection, non-direction
and failure to observe directions would be sufficient to assure them
such control. And this power, once garnered, is grudgingly sur-
rendered even to legislative assault. Let the legislature attempt
to restore some wonted prestige to the jury and such a decision as
that in Thoe v. C. M. St. Paul Railway Company 87 will be forth-
coming, wherein the court will rise to abide its oath to uphold and
maintain the constitution by preserving inviolate its power to re-
verse a judgement which is contrary to the evidence. Of course,
should the organic law creating the court itself forbid the entertain-
ment of a motion for a new trial based on the verdict being contrary
to the evidence, the court may . feel constrained to abide by the
restriction, but nevertheless it may examine the evidence without
compunction to determine whether on account of its lack, the verdict
was coiitrary to law 88 or whether the jury failed to observe the
directions of the court. These are questions of law and of the very
essence of judicial power, which may even be implied from the
constitutional division of government into three coirdinate branches.
The federal courts, hampered only by the broad constitutional
provision preserving the right of trial by jury, followed to an extent
the English practice. They now consistently charge the jury orally,
sum up the evide-pce, comment on it and even give the jury the
benefit of opinion provided it is made clear that the jury is not
to be controlled by it. And since the jurors are for the most part
ordinary individuals, impressed by the solemnity and atmosphere
of the court into an unwonted timidity and docility, the federal judge
usually has it in his power, if he so wills, to mold a verdict in
accord with his own views.
But to preserve trial by jury 'inviolate' in the states, such practices
as prevail in the federal courts were circumvented by various taboos.
Quite the natural reaction of the state appellate courts then was
to utilize these taboos and their power to protect the jury from
inaccuracies of judicial statement to subjugate the trial court and
jury.
87. 181 Wis., 456, 195 N. W. 407 (1923).
88. Monroe County v. Driskell, 3 Ga. App. 583 (1907).
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Thus, the Supreme Court of California (Department One) held
that the use of the disjunctive "or" between the words "aid" and
"abet" was not fatal error, because to the ordinary mind one who
aids or assists in the commission of forgery is guilty; and this is
true because to such a mind criminality is included as an element
in the act of the party aiding or assisting. But the court en bane,
decided that the use of the disjunctive was prejudicial error because
"the word 'aid' does not imply guilty knowledge or felonious intent,
whereas the definition of the word 'abet' includes knowledge of the
wrongful purpose of the perpetrator and counsel and encourage-
ment in the crime." 89
In a somewhat similar situation, the court of Montana e-x'pressed
the attitude of the state courts generally in its gentle admonition:
"In this connection we may observe that it is far safer for a trial
court to make use of instructions generally approved by the courts
rather than to risk the danger of invading the province of the jury
by formulating new ones." 90 The use of instructions that have been
repeated over and over is "the safe practice and obviates the
necessity of a consideration of instructions on the subject differently
worded." 91
Thus are instructions reduced to formalism. From the taboos
calculated to safeguard the province of the jury have been derived
the means for surreptitiously scaling its walls. The original purpose
of giving instructions for the actual enlightenment of the jury,
to assist them in applying the law to the facts, has become incon-
sequential. 92
The priests, however, are not fooled by the system evolved. The
lawyers and judges are perfectly aware that juries pay scant atten-
tion to the type of instructions commonly given them on the law
applicable to the facts, and that as a rule they are incapable of the
89. People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 55 Pac. 581 (1898); approved in 123 Cal.
403, 56 Pac. 44 (1899).
90. State v. Allen, 34 Mont. 403, 87 Pac. 177 (1906). See also MeQueary
v. People, 48 Colo. 214, 110 Pac. 210 (1910) ; State v. Murray, 91 Mo. 95, 3 S. W.
397 (1886) ; Lawless v. State, 4 Lea 179 (Tenn. 1879).
91. Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 9 Pac. 4 (1885). "Its very novelty was a
sufficient reason for its refusal. It is a maxim of the law that 'the old way
is the safe way."' McAlpine v. State, 47 Ala. 78, 82 (1872). See also Berko-
vitz v. Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 215 Pac. 675 (1923).
92. Anderson v. Horlick's Malted Milk Co., 137 Wis. 569, 579, 119 N. W.
342 (1909) : "While a trial judge, as an original matter, may be able to state
a rule of law more concisely and in language more easily understood by the
ordinary juror than the examples given by this court for stating the same
rule, such departures are to be avoided, generally speaking, since they are quite
liable to result in just the difficulty we are now dealing with."
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fine discrimination such an application requires. But it is impressive
to the public and it clothes the jurors with a sanctimonious mantle
of enlightenment which gives them a sense of peace and accord with
authority. Trial lawyers may consume a great deal of time on
instructions, but little of it is wasted on attempting to force the
jury's attention to them. It is usually as futile as reading a decision
of the supreme court to a justice of the peace or arguing the
Constitution with a policeman.
III
The Function of Instructions from the Lawyer's Viewpoint as
Traps for the Courts
Under the common law the court has the right to instruct the
jury of its own motion 93 and in some states it is under a duty to
do so.94 But in all jurisdictions exceptions can be taken to instruc-
tions whether they be offered by court or by counsel, written or
oral, in time or out. They may also be suggested either in whole or
in addition, so that ultimately the language, form and substance
of the instruction or charge will be guided in large measure by the
wit and ingenuity of counsel. In those states where written in-
structions are required, they are usually wholly devised and offered
by counsel, subject to modification by the court.
Insofar as the lawyer is concerned, the least of his worries is
the conveyance of'a correct dissertation on the law to the jury for
the jury. For the instructions will profit him little if he hag not
been able to get in enough helpful evidence to'enable him to appeal
to the emotions of the jurors in his summation. But what a grave
error the grant or refusal of a phrase, or even a single word chosen
from the host of others, can be made to appear to an appellate court
in a brief!
For counsel having that side of the cause which is weaker in
law or less captivating in emotion, instructions are an ever-present
help in time of trouble. He has everything to gain by requesting
a great number. Aside from the greater force on appeal thereby
93. City of Chicago v. Keefe, 114 Ill. 222, 2 N. E. 267 (1885).
94. People v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206 (1866); New London Water Comm'rs
v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 74 Atl. 938 (1910); Central Rr. v. Harris, 76 Ga.
501 (1886); Tretter v. Chicago Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 375, 126 N. W. 339 (1910);
Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457, 1 S. W. 731 (1886); Maxwell v. Mass,
Title Insurance Co., 206 Mass. 197, 92 N. E. 42 (1910). In other states the rule
is sometimes confined to criminal cases. See BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 71,
at 358, notes 12 and 13.
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afforded his argument that the jury failed to observe the instructions
granted, he has high hopes that a harassed trial judge will refuse
at least a few, and the more the better. Especially is this true in
representing defendants in criminal and tort cases. In criminal
cases if the jury should acquit, any erroneous instructions will be no
weapon for the state's attorney. And in tort cases, a plaintiff who
can not win in the first trial, while the story is fresh and the
witnesses responsive, may be expected to fare no better after the
facts are cold and some of the witnesses absent. Moreover, most
plaintiffs in tort cases, are not financially capable of sustained
litigation and so the defendant's counsel is very careful to "perfect
the record." One of the prime attributes of such "perfection" is
to have a grand climax of errors in granting or refusing instructions
with the exceptions properly noted. 5
That "to launch such a mass of legal conundrums upon a court
which can never enlighten a jury, but are drawn generally with the
real, if not avowed purpose of getting error into the record and
entangling the court in some technical contradiction that may be
used in a higher court, is a perversion of the law of instructing
juries", was discovered by the Illinois Appellate Court in 1885.00
But the censure did not discourage subsequent counsel for defendants
in that state,97 and the appellate court, realizing the futility and
impropriety of an arbitrary rule limiting the number, decided that
ca trial judge in the throes accompanying the examination of fifty
or more instructions has our sincere sympathy, but relief rests with
counsel not with the court." 98
The Missouri court in a similar situation lost patience with the
trial court:
95. "Counsel for the defendant will usually not be solicitous to have the
court correct a mistake in his charge to the jury because in event of an un-
favorable verdict, the erroneous instructions given to the jury may constitute
reversible error and he will be able to overturn the verdict by a motion for
a new trial or on appeal. In such case counsel cannot be expected to urge his
objections very strenuously to an erroneous instruction. He will probably take
an exception to the erroneous portion of the charge and let the matter rest
there and if the plaintiff does not take steps to see that all erroneous in-
structions are corrected, the verdict of the jury will avail him nothing."
CoRNELrus' TRIAL TAcTics (1932) 291.
96. Citizens Gaslight Association v. O'Brien, 19 InI. App. 231 (1885).
97. Chicago Athletic Club v. Eddy Electric LI'f'g Co., 77 Ill. App. 204 (1898)
(84 instructions asked); La Salle Coal Co. v. Eastman, 99 Ill. App. 495 (1902)
(93 instructions asked). See also Grudzinske v. Chicago Ry. Co., 165 Iln. App.
152 (1911); Casey v. Reedy Elevator Co., 166 Ill. App. 595 (1912).
98. Daily v. Smith-Hippen Co., 111 Ill. App. 319 (1903); see also Chicago




"The changes rung on all phases of this case, and some not of this
case, remind one of what Judge Scott used to say was 'like the multiplica-
tion table set to music.' We have remonstrated with the trial courts for
years about the great impropriety and frequent injustice resulting from
writing or giving instructions by the acre, but without avail, and so
resort must be had to more drastic measures. We therefore hold that the
great number of instructions given in this instance, of itself, warrants
a reversal of the judgment." 09
If the jury is to be given a rounded view of the applicable law,
it must get it from the trial judge, who is! least prepared by im-
mediate study and preparation for the task. The cause probably
has original features but if the judge attempts original instructions,
he will step into innumerable pitfalls of precedent. The plaintiff
offers few suggestions, fearing these dangers. The defendant
seductively offers many or perhaps indignantly demands them.
Assuming that they are all legally correct, there is still the hazard
of error in influencing the jury, by repetition, to believe that the
court is on the defendant's side. If the judge refuses some of them,
he is no doubt walking into the trap as planned. If he modifies and
combines several of them without technical error he is a genius.
It is no wonder, then, that any action he may take will be couched
as far as possible in ritualistic statement, with his whole attention
fixed on the probable reaction of the appellate judges and not on
the twelve good men and true.
And so the threet officers of the court to whom is entrusted the
duty of acquainting the jury with the law are too busily engaged
in dealing with the importunate artifices which are employed for
the benefit of the appellate court to attend the theoretical arts. It
is not intended generally that the jury should get an enlightened
dissertation on the law under our present system-and who wishes
that they should?
IV
The Function of Instructions as A Method by Which the Trial
Court Maintains Its Integrity
Although bearing the same label, there are two distinct types of
instructions which are so different from all other members of the
99. Sidway v. Missouri Land Co., 163 Mo. 342, 63 S. W. 705 (1901). For
a full discussion see Note, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1087.
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class, as to be commonly identified by the adjectives: cautionary
and peremptory. The so-called cautionary instructions are not in-
structions of law, although occasionally they are mistaken and
treated as such by appellate courts. They are in large part sug-
gestive, psychological guides to bring into the open the possibility
of unduly influential emotional ferment. They tend to put the jury
in the right attitude insofar as their own consciences are concerned.
But it is doubtful that the mere enunciation of rules can increase the
measure of comprehension and inhibit the natural reactions to evi-
dence, or regulate arbitrarily the interpretations which other minds
will make on the expressions or directions theretofore voiced.
Chief Justice McBride of Oregon, after delivering an opinion on
cautionary instructions, said:
"The writer when upon the circuit bench was in the habit of giving such
an instruction as a matter of course in cases of this character and in
trials of homicide, but it is not certain that it ever had a particle of effect,
as no juryman is ever aware that his opinion is being affected by the subtle
influence of sympathy." 100
It is difficult to conceive of the phlegmatic utterance of such a
bromide as, the jury "should not lose their heads and return a
verdict for a lady on general principles," 101 having any very serious
chance of counteracting the tender sympathies of sturdy jurors.
But cautionary instructions are not confined to guarding against
sympathy and prejudice. They fulfill a very distinct need for the
trial court when it is called upon to rule on innumerable and un-
expected questions of law from the beginning of the trial to the end.
Especially is this true as to questions dealing with the taking of
testimony, the predication of evidence, conformity to the pleadings
and admission and competence generally. It is imperative that he
make some immediate disposition of the problem if the trial is not
to drag out interminably. In a vast number of instances, counsel
have not foreseen the particular issue and their resulting argument
substitutes vehemence for erudition. Many trial courts in such a
dilemma adopt the crafty practice of admitting such questionable
testimony for the time being, and then in the light of subsequent
developments excluding such phases as seem incompetent by an
100. Sheurmann v. Mathison, 67 Ore. 419, 136 Pac. 330 (1913).
101. But perhaps it did have some influence in the case in which it was
uttered as the jury found against the lady. Bingham v. Bernard, 36 Minn.
114, 30 N. W. 404 (1886).
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instruction cautioning the jurors to disregard it 102 or limit their
consideration of the testimony to particular purposes.
10 3 This may
make the lawyer excepting tear his hair, since he realizes the great
unlikelihood of the jury being able to divest itself of particular
sentences heard in a composite narrative some time earlier. But it
is a great thing for the trial court over whom hovers the omni-
present, ominous cloud of reversal. With a fair amount of common
sense and a modicum of 'legal hunch', a trial judge can by means
of cautionary instructions, knock innumerable props from under
otherwise dynamic exceptions-leaving the record cured of a multi-
tude of sins. Even an incursion into the province of the jury may
be rectified by judiciously reminding the jurors that they are the
sole judges of the facts 104 and they should not attempt to infer what
the court's opinion may be.'0 5 If counsel oversteps decorum in his
speech to the jury, the trial judge may brush away his sophistries, 10 0
weaken his protestations, 0 7 or possibly cure his improprieties by a
word of warning to the jury 0 8
Cautionary instructions, of which there are many others not in-
dicated in the foregoing, are generally held to be within the discretion
of the trial court. 0 0 This adds excellence to their use as weapons
to fend off the technical designs of the lawyer on appeal, however
trivial their effect may be in influencing the jury.
Mention has already been made of that other very significant
weapon which the trial court has developed for the maintenance
of its integrity by overt direction of the verdict-the peremptory
instruction. The use of this device seems to have developed
alongside the obsolescence of the demurrer to evidence and some
102. Foxworth v. Brown, 120 Ala. 59, 24 So. 1 (1897); Williams v. State,
515, 134 S. W. 1169 (1911) ; State v. McKowen, 126 La. 1075, 53 So. 353 (1910).
107 Ga. 721, 33 S. E. 648 (1899); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Stein, 142 Ky.
103. James v. State, 167 Ala. 14, 52 So. 840 (1910); People v. Gray, 60
Cal. 271, 5 Pac. 240 (1884) ; Porter v. State, 173 Ind. 694, 91 N. H. 340 (1910) ;
State v. Collins, 121 N. C. 667, 28 S. E. 520 (1897); Farwell v. Warren, 51
Ill. 467 (1869); Giddings v. Baker, 80 Tex. 308, 16 S. W. 33 (1891); People
v. Hagenow, 236 Ill. 514, 86 N. E. 370 (1908).
104. Doll v. Chicago Consolidated Traction Co., 153 Ill. App. 442 (1910).
105. North Chicago Street Rr. Co. v. Kaspers, 186 Ill. 246, 57 N. E. 849
(1900).
106. State v. Way, 38 S. C. 333, 347, 17 S. E. 39 (1892).
107. Smith v. State, 95 Ga. 472, 20 S. E. 275, 20 S. E. 291 (1894).
108. Morehouse v. Remson, 59 Conn. 392, 22 Atl. 427 (1890).
109. Day v. State, 54 Fla. 25, 44 So. 715 (1907); State v. Barton, 70 Ore.
470, 142 Pac. 348 (1914). City of Tacoma v. Wetherby, 57 Wash. 295, 100
Pac. 903 (1910); Birmingham Fire Insurance Co. v. Pulver, 126 Ill. 329, 18
N. E. 804 (1888); Dinsmore v. State, 61 Neb. 418, 85 N. W. 445 (1901).
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courts apply the same test.110 Various other tests are applied, such
as scintilla of evidence 1n and reasonable inference,"- but the results
are very much the same and the general rule is that a verdict should
be directed if a contrary finding of the jury would be set aside.1 3
It is also generally held that the court has no right to direct a verdict
of guilty in a criminal trial,114 although the direction in favor of the
accused is both frequent and unquestioned.lla
The peremptory instruction has become so unrelated to all other
types of instructions that it is now seldom treated under that classifica-
tion. Of course it is a palpable invasion of the "province" of the
jury and in direct contravention to those rules which are ordinarily
regarded as fundamental.11 6 Its progress from the scintilla rule
110. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917);
Chicago Bank v. Northwestern National Bank, 152 Ill. 296, 38 N. E. 739
(1894); Hayward v. North Jersey Street Ry. Co., 74 N. J. L. 678, 65 AUt. 737
(1906).
111. People v. People's Insurance Exchange, 126 Ill. 466, 18 N. E. 774
(1888); Anfensen v. Banks, 180 Iowa 1066, 163 N. W. 608 (1917).
112. Philadelphia Rr. Co. v. Gatta, 4 Boyce 38 (Del. 1913), 85 AUt. 721;
Habeck v. Chicago Ry. Co., 146 Wis. 645, 132 N. W. 618 (1911).
113. Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison Ry. Co., 210 U. S. 1 (1907); Bell
v. Carter, 164 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908); Livesay v. Denver Bank, 36 Colo.
526 (1906); Wolf v. Chicago Co., 233 Ill. 501, 84 N. E. 614 (1908); Moore
v. McKenney, 83 Me. 80, 21 Atl. 749 (1890); Lutz v. Atlantic Rr. Co., 6 N. M.
496, 30 Pac. 912 (1892); Supreme Tribe v. Owens, 50 Okla. 629, 151 Pae. 198
(1915); Dwight v. Germania Life Insurance Co., 103 N. Y. 341, 8 N. E. 654
(1886); Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 34 N. E. 342 (1893); Morris v.
Warwick, 42 Wash, 480, 85 Pae. 48 (1906); Norvell v. Kanawha Rr. Co., 67
W. Va. 467, 68 S. E. 288 (1910).
114. Sparf v. U. S., supra note 50; Konda v. U. S., 166 Fed. 91 (C. C. A.
7th, 1908); State v. Koch, 33 Mont. 490, 85 Pac. 272 (1905); State v. Godwin,
145 N. C. 461, 59 S. E. 132 (1907). The Arkansas court has held that even
a verdict of guilty may be directed, -where the punishment does not include
imprisonment. Paxton v. State, 114 Ark. 393, 170 S. W. 80 (1914).
115. Jackson v. State, 178 Ala. 76, 60 So. 97 (1912); State v. McCaffrey,
181 Ind. 200, 103 N. E. 801 (1914); People v. Minney, 155 Mich. 534, 119 N. W.
918 (1909); Isbell v. U. S., 227 Fed. 788 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); State v.
Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 124 Atl. 375 (1924); State v. Gomez, 58 Mont. 177,
190 Pac. 982 (1920); Stare v. McHenry, 93 W. Va. 396, 117 S. E. 143 (1923);
State v. Myer, 69 Iowa, 148, 28 N. W. 484 (1886); Combs v. Commonwealth,
162 Ky. 86, 172 S. W. 101 (1915); State v. Grondin, 113 Me. 479, 94 Atl. 947
(1915) ; State v. Young, 237 Mo. 170, 140 S. W. 873 (1911) ; People v. Ledwon,
153 N. Y. 10, 46 N. E. 1046 (1897); State v. Norman, 153 N. C. 591, 68 S. E.
917 (1910); State v. Fiester, 32 Ore. 254, 50 Pac. 551 (1897); Devoy v. State,
122 Wis. 148, 99 N. W. 455 (1904).
116. In the earlier cases even 'where a verdict was directed in civil matters
it was considered that the direction must be that if the jury believed all the
testimony they should so find, otherwise the court would be infringing on the
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through the equivalent of the demurrer to evidence concept, to
setting aside the verdict, has got it where the most elegant circum-
locution would be required to make it appear other than an in-
fringement. 117  While the warrant for a directed verdict on the
ground that if a contrary verdict were returned the court would
be under necessity of setting it aside, seems logical enough in the
setting of present-day attitudes, there is a vast difference. Setting
aside the verdict means a new trial by a new jury with time inter-
vening for mutations in evidential strengths with always the pos-
sibility of compromise; but a directed verdict constitutes res ad-
judicata."8
To the ordinary mind, all the reasons for directing a verdict for
the plaintiff in a civil suit apply with equal cogency to the direction
of a verdict for the state. In a criminal trial and in one of the
earlier cases on the subject, Circuit Justice Hunt so far lost his
judicial equilibrium over the unheard of temerity of a female by the
name of Susan B. Anthony, who, knowing she was a woman, yet had
the effrontery to vote in a congressional election, that he came right
out and reasoned along such lines to sustain his action in having
directed the jury to find her guilty." 9 This grave error in pre-
suming that there was no distinction between the inviolability of
jury trials in civil cases and in criminal cases, was of course un-
pardonable, particularly at a time when the judiciary was quietly
inherent right of the jury to pass on the credibility of the witnesses. S o
again the opinion in 11 Fed. 478 (C. C. R. 1. 1882). See also Gwyn Harper
Co. v. Carolina Central Rr., 128 N. C. 280, 38 S. E. 894 (1901). Under present
practice the instruction is a mere matter of form after the motion is granted
and judgment is usually given regardless of what the jury may think. When
a peremptory instruction is granted, the jury may even be compelled to return
a verdict accordingly. Curran v. Stein, 110 Ky. 99, 60 S. W. 839 (1901);
W. B. Grimes Dry Goods Co. v. Malcolm, 164 U. S. 483 (1896). Or the court
may direct entry of verdict without their assent. Cahill v. Chicago etc. Ry.
Co., 74 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 7th, 1896). See also In re Sharon's Estate, 179
Cal. 447, 177 Pac. 283 (1918) ; Banfill v. Byrd, 122 Miss. 288, 84 So. 227 (1920) ;
Kirshenbaum v. Mass. Bonding etc. Co., 107 Neb. 494, 186 N. W. 529 (1922).
117. But cf. Catlett v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 57 Ark. 461, 21 S. W. 1062 (1893);
Hopkins v. Nashville Rr. Co., 96 Tenn. 409, 34 S. W. 1029 (1896).
118. Denver v. Home Savings Bank, 200 Fed. 28, (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) aff'd,
236 U. S. 101 (1915); In re Sharon's Estate, supra note 116; Andrews v.
School District, 35 Minn. 70, 27 N. W. 303 (1886); Dunseth v. Butte Electric
Ry. Co., 41 Mont. 14, 108 Pac. 567 (1910); Reams v. Sinclair, 97 Neb, 542,
150 N. W. 826 (1915); Wicks v. Sanborn, 72 Ore. 321, 143 Pac. 1007 (1914);
H. F. Watson Co. v. Citizens Concrete Co., 28 R. I. 472, 68 Atl. 310 (1907);
McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S. C. 523, 74 S. E. 386 (1912); Morgan v. Chicago
Ry Co., 83 Wis. 348, 53 N. W. 741 (1892).
119. 24 Fed. Cas. 829 (1873).
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curbing the jury in civil cases without disturbing the public mind.
The worst of it was that his deductions appeared unanswerable in
view of the precedents as to the duty of the jury to take the law
from the court.'2 0 But a few years later matters were very neatly
set back into their former paths by Justice McCrary in a decision
which became the leading case on the rule that verdicts can not be
directed for the state in a criminal case. This decision deserves a
large place in our legal history as a monumental example of judicial
ingenuity in reconciling conflicting principles for the purpose of
preserving expeditious tendencies. After a facile discourse on con-
stitutional provisions and the respective provinces of the court and
jury the justice offers this unexpected yet judicially satisfactory
solution:
"It is now well settled in civil cases, where the facts are undisputed and
the case turns upon questions of law, the court may direct a verdict in
accordance with its opinion of the law; but the authorities which settle
this rule have no application to criminal cases. In a civil case the court
may set aside the verdict, whether it be for the plaintiff or defendant,
upon the ground that it is contrary to the law as given by the court;
but in a criminal case if the verdict is one of acquittal, the court has no
power to set it aside. It would be a useless form for a court to submit
a civil case involving only questions of law to the consideration of a jury,
where the verdict when found, if not in accordance with the court's view
of the law would be set aside. The same result is accomplished by an
instruction given in advance to find a verdict in accordance with the
court's opinion of the law. But not so in criminal cases. A verdict of
acquittal cannot be set aside and therefore if the court can direct a verdict
of guilty, it can do indirectly that which it has no power to do directly." 121
On such a foundation much of the later law of peremptory in-
structions or directed verdicts has been built. Since there can be
no directed verdicts for the state in criminal cases the integrity of
jury trials has been preserved as a sop to traditional guaranties;
but the inroads upon jury trial§ in civil cases have been considerable
by both courts and legislatures. It is probable that, in an age when
juries are coming more and more into disrepute as a drag on
efficient administration, the possibilities of peremptory instructions
will be more deeply probed. An observation of the cases in the
last decade will convince one that direction of the verdict is fast
becoming one of the most customary and efficient tools of the trial
court.
120. On reflection, however, Justice Hunt seems to have relented for in
the trial of the election officers growing out of the same matter, he modified his
instruction. 11 Fed. 470, 473 (C. C. Kan. 1882).




Procedural Problems Arising as A Result and the Escapes
from these Problems
A critical examination of a decision seldom reveals the precarious
snares baited for appellate judges. Neither does it reveal their
extremity at times in extricating themselves in accordance with their
convictions and yet in a rational manner. Many appellate judges
no doubt suffer from conflicts between the past promises of stare
decisis and the present virtue8 of personal conviction. Some blindly
follow a literal interpretation of precedent and justify themselves
with loyalty to their oaths. Others follow conscience and rationalize
as best they can, or overrule as occasion requires. Still others,
with more of a penchant for "state-craft", shape the materiality of
the facts to fit the salient principles of the past and in this manner
forecast what they consider the genius of the law-at the same time
preserving their sacred oaths unsullied. But regardless of methods,
on them is cast the ultimate responsibility of weaving the seamless
web. An enumerated treatment of the obvious specific problems
suggested by the varied functions of instructions would result in
too burdensome a reiteration of much of the matter hereinbefore
detailed. A few general observations should suffice to terminate
this discussion.
The fallacy of the use of law and fact as a categorical test for
the various phases of jury trial was effe~tively shown by Dean Thayer
in an excellent article published in 1890, in which he pointed out
that a great deal of confusion resulted from defining the terms in
verbal equivalents.12 2 More recently Dean Green has discussed the
desirability of such expansible and collapsible terms which elude the
strictures of definitive bonds:
"No two terms of legal science have rendered better service than 'law' and
'fact'. They are basic assumptions; irreducible minimums and the most
comprehensive maximums at the same instant. They readily accommodate
themselves to any. meaning we may desire to give them. In them and
their kind a science of law finds its strength and durability. They are the
creations of centuries. What judge has not found refuge in them? The
man who could succeed in defining them would be a public enemy. They
may torture the souls of language mechanicians who insist that all words
122. "But if we ask the question what sort of thing it is that is for the
court and what for the jury, we do not get on, for we are told that matters
of law are for the court and matters of fact for the jury, ad questionem, etc.
. . . We do not then escape the necessity of trying to determine what is a
matter of fact and what is a matter of law." Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury
Trials (1890) 4 HARv. L. REV. 147.
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and phrases must have a fixed content but they and their flexibility are
essential to the science which has to do with the control of men through
power to pass judgment on their conduct." 123
Dean Green further develops these terms in the allocation of the
functions of judge and jury generally and with particularity in
deceit, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution.2 4
Professor Bohlen considers the dissertation on law and fact the
least satisfactory of Dean Green's book.12 5 But be that as it may,
the criticism merely emphasizes the more important point that there
continue to be many cavil-breeding procedural problems which re-
sult from the piling up of decisions based on the province of court
and jury. Law and fact are used as the basic criterions for the
content of instructions and charges which in turn become devices
for the variety of untheoretical uses and functions in the hands of
trial judges, lawyers and appellate courts. And aside from the
procedural confusion, there is the assertedly graver problem of the
crystallization of rules, preventing growth to meet new social de-
velopments.
Professor Bohlen, as he himself indicates in his review of Dean
Green's book,12 6 has considered these matters with respect to
negligence (though not specifically from the stand-point of instruc-
tions) in his "Mlixed Questions of Law and Fact." ' In the tendency
of the courts to usurp the functions of the jury in the fixing of
negligence standards he sees two great dangers:
(1) "undue rigidity which results from the unfortunate feeling that
any decision of a court creates a rule of law which, as law, is absolutely
and eternally valid"; and (2) the fixing of "standards of conduct so
definite and precise as to give to unscrupulous practitioners extraordinary
opportunities for the successful coaching of witnesses."
Finally, he hopes that in the usurpation of this function of the jury,
the courts will realize that "they are exercising an administrative
function and that such decisions are not like their decisions declaring
those principles which are fundamental to our concept of law,
sacrosanct from judicial re-examination and change under changing
conditions."
The second danger suggested by Professor Bohlen may be dis-
missed with few words. It is patent that there is presently less
123. Green, op. cit. supra note 82, at 270.
124. Id. at 278 et seq.
125. (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 783.
126. Ibid.
127. (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 111.
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precision in the law of negligence as to standards of conduct than
in any other branch of the law. Yet no unscrupulous lawyer being
a 'reasonable man' should anticipate any greater difficulty in coach-
ing a witness in such manner as easily to "escape a non-suit or a
directed verdict for the defendant". The net difference, if any, is
probably to cause the manufacture of a much better quality of lie
for the sake of safety. But admitting the efficacy of this danger,
the courts cannot very well afford to adopt the policy of either
retaining a standard in its own bosom for fear the unscrupulous
lawyer will learn what it is, or occasionally overruling a prior de-
cision in order to bring him up with a jerk.
As to the first danger and the suggestion advanced, Professor
Bohlen perhaps overlooks the manner in which lawyers and judges
work and have worked since time immemorial. There is apparently
nothing more hateful and ill-advised to them than a frontal attack
on a problem. It simply does not jibe with the legal mind or the
spirit of our system. Flanking movements have made the significant
history of our law, to the amazement and occasional disgust of
all except those who practice it. In stating the danger, Professor
Bohlen himself suggests the antipathy for change but he fails to
take into account that even if a rule which has become a "scandal
and a hissing" goes for a long time unchanged, it does not follow
that its force persists unimpaired when once the court has become
convinced of its pernicious social value. Has any ingenious judge
had serious difficulty in accomplishing desired results indirectly?
The courts have sufficient means of administration. What they
need is convictive guidance; direction is more important than
directness. Appellate judges could scarcely wish for freer rein in
causes tried by juries. While the myriad of precise rules laid down
for the instruction of juries and the apparent impossibility of sat-
isfying all of them in a particular case would seem to have reduced
the procedure to such precarious technicalities that the appellate
court would be bound to grant a new trial, yet everyone knows such
is not the truth. Misdirection, non-direction and failure to observe
directions were manufactured by the courts themselves from the
raw materials of law and fact for the control of others, and it should
not be expected that clever courts will be entrapped in their own
devices. There are three more or less arbitrary escapes by which
the judgment of the lower court may be affirmed without even leaving
the semblance of a track: (1) by ignoring questions raised in the
record, (2) memorandum decisions and (3) discretionary appeals.
None of these, however, is the prevailing mode. The use of the
two latter will no doubt receive favorable expansion as the appalling
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rate of printed reports renders some such drastic action necessary.
But by far the most frequently used now is that ubiquitous exit,
non-prejudicial error,128 at the door of which the unanswerable logic
of an appeal brief premised on stare decisis falls.
128. It should be noted that the verdict is now tested by the courts con-
sidering whether or not the jury was misled instead of whether it inay have
been misled. A host of authorities may be found for harmless and non-
prejudicial error under Appeal and Error in the A.IxcAN DIGEST SYSTEM .
and CoRpus Juais as well as in other standard works. Of course some states have
provision for it by constitution and statute, (e.g., CAL. CoNsr. art. VI. § 4,-),
but since the provision is made flexible enough so that injustice may not
result, the decisions are scarcely different from those of other states having
no such written provision. This may be seen from a casual perusal of TREAD-
WELL'S ANNOTATIONS (6th ed. 1931).
